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Abstract
The field of cognitive psychology has increasingly provided scientific insights to explore how humans are subject 
to unconscious sources of evidentiary bias, leading to errors that can affect judgement and decision-making. 
Increasingly these insights are being applied outside the realm of individual decision-making to the collective 
arena of policy-making as well. A recent editorial in this journal has particularly lauded the work of the World 
Bank for undertaking an open and critical reflection on sources of unconscious bias in its own expert staff that 
could undermine achievement of its key goals. The World Bank case indeed serves as a remarkable case of a 
global policy-making agency making its own critical reflections transparent for all to see. Yet the recognition 
that humans are prone to cognitive errors has been known for centuries, and the scientific exploration of such 
biases provided by cognitive psychology is now well-established. What still remains to be developed, however, is 
a widespread body of work that can inform efforts to institutionalise strategies to mitigate the multiple sources 
and forms of evidentiary bias arising within administrative and policy-making environments. Addressing this 
gap will require a programme of conceptual and empirical work that supports robust development and evaluation 
of institutional bias mitigation strategies. The cognitive sciences provides a scientific basis on which to proceed, 
but a critical priority will now be the application of that science to improve policy-making within those agencies 
taking responsibility for social welfare and development programmes.
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The World Bank’s recognition of how cognitive biases can lead to errors by its own expert staff (see editorial by Mckee and Stuckler)1 can be interpreted in two 
ways. It can be seen as an important example of transparent 
critical self-reflection by powerful global institution, or it can 
be seen as a long-overdue step to act upon a well-established 
scientific field with implications for policy and practice. It is 
likely an example of both. 
McKee and Stuckler call for more institutions to adopt 
‘reflective practice’ mirroring that seen in the World Bank’s 
2015 World Development Report.2 Yet recognition of the 
need for critical self-reflection is not new, being called for 
by Mannheim, for instance, in his early work outlining the 
sociology of knowledge (first published in English in 1936).3 
However, it is indeed rare for global policy-influencing bodies 
to undertake such reflections so openly, especially when it 
can equate to admission of past errors. The World Bank has 
not been without controversy, at the centre of long running 
debates about whether particular development approaches (eg, 
structural adjustment programmes) have caused more harm 
than good in low-income settings.4 As such the organisation 
could be particularly sensitive to showing that its experts are 
subject to bias. The agency must also justify its budget to its 
donor governments, which can further incentivise the non-
admission of faults. In such ways, it is refreshing to see such an 
open reflection on how error-prone the agency can be, which 
can indeed serve as an example for many other organisations 
as McKee and Stuckler’s express.
But the fact that humans are prone to evidentiary bias and 
judgement errors (what has often been termed ‘irrationality’) 
arising through cognitive processes, is something that has 
been recognised historically. We can, therefore, equally 
question why we have not done more to address this in our 
policy-making institutions – settings in which evidentiary 
errors can have profound implications for decisions affecting 
human life and welfare. Mannheim himself refers even 
further back to Francis Bacon’s 17th century Novum Organum 
Scientarium [New Instrument of Science], which identified 
a set of ‘idols’ that (as described by Zargorin) capture “the 
mental, psychological and socially engendered dispositions 
and beliefs that [are] responsible for systematic distortion and 
error (pp. 387).”5 
Indeed, some of the World Bank’s own errors have been well-
known for some time. A widely-cited reading in the field of 
international development, for instance, is Ferguson’s 1994 
book The Anti-Politics Machine,6 which, two decades ago, 
illustrated how the World Bank interpreted evidence about 
Lesotho in repeatedly biased ways. The World Bank, to its 
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credit, acknowledges Ferguson’s insights in the 2015 World 
Development Report. Yet it is clear that there is a need for 
organisations involved in social policy development to better 
integrate the learning and knowledge we have about cognitive 
bias into their institutional systems and structures to prevent 
such errors from occurring, or to recognise them more 
quickly when they do occur. 
While the existence of unconscious bias has been recognised 
for centuries, what the field of cognitive psychology has 
particularly brought to this topic is a scientific rigour to study 
the origins and mechanisms by which they arise. What has 
arguably been lacking, then, is greater application of these 
insights within policy-making systems. Indeed, just such a 
gap was identified by the US National Research Council in 
2012, which concluded that while: 
“[t]here is an extensive literature in cognitive social 
psychology and behavioral decision theory on how people 
make judgments, decisions, and choices…. These sciences 
have not…been applied to collective reasoning and group 
decision-making in public policy settings at anything close 
to the level needed” (pp. 57, emphasis in original).7 
But what would it mean to address this gap, and to apply 
these insights into such settings in a more systematic, and 
scientifically grounded manner? 
McKee and Stuckler end their editorial pointing to possible 
remedies. Some of these are individually oriented – like 
increasing awareness of the problem – while others are 
institutional, such as removing incentives that lead to 
particular biases, or formalising rules that force decision-
makers to see issues from a different perspective. This kind of 
thinking should be seen as a critical next step in the application 
of the cognitive sciences to improve decision-making, but 
current efforts serve as only the tip of a much broader field 
of future work. Specifically, a great deal more remains to be 
done to understand both how decision-making biases arise, as 
well as how to institutionalise structures, rules, and practices 
that make biased uses of evidence less likely, more obvious, 
and/or more manageable. Institutional changes will need to 
be based on both conceptual insights and empirical validation 
if they are to provide sustained and successful responses to 
these challenges.
In clinical medicine, some initial thinking in this area is 
taking place. The use of checklists to avoid certain diagnostic 
or treatment errors has been increasingly established8 – 
although it has been noted that there have not yet been 
extensive evaluations of this approach.9 Yet while basic errors 
may arise from so-called fast thinking in time-critical setting 
(which checklists often address), Seisha et al10 have used the 
term ‘cognitive biases plus’ to conceptualise other drivers of 
bias such as ‘groupthink,’ herd effects, or misaligned incentives 
that occur at organisational levels and undermine the 
practice of evidence-based medicine. Croskerry has similarly 
identified over 30 cognitive sources of diagnostic error, and 10 
basic strategies for ‘cognitive debiasing’ to help avoid errors. 
‘Metacognition’ is held up as a central approach – capturing 
the process of stepping back from decisions to critically 
reflect on potential bias.11 In a later article, Croskerry et al 
further identified a large number of ‘forcing functions’ which 
would mandate a step to be taken by a clinician in a decision 
process12; steps that could be institutionalised, for instance, by 
establishing formal rules about when checks or confirmation 
steps must happen before progression in treatment. 
Some of these ideas are echoed in the critical reflection seen 
by the World Bank, but it is important to recognise there can 
be important differences between overcoming bias in clinical 
decision-making and within social policy decision processes. 
Policy decisions are rarely simple technical exercises aiming 
to achieve a universally agreed goal. Rather, policy-making 
typically involves making decidedly political choices over 
which course of action to follow, involving multiple competing 
priorities and potential disagreement about relevant outcomes 
to pursue. This reality, however, means that cognitive bias 
may arise in a number of different ways in policy processes. In 
a forthcoming work, I attempt to develop a ‘cognitive-political 
framework’ that maps out how key features of policy problems 
such as their contestation, complexity or uncertainty, and 
polarisation can manifest in different forms of evidentiary 
bias through different mechanisms.13 So, for instance, while 
numerical errors may arise from ‘fast’ intuitive thinking in 
complicated situations, in highly polarised political debates, 
there can be different pressure towards what has been termed 
‘identity protective cognition’ in which individuals interpret 
evidence in ways that align with the values of their existing 
affinity group.14 Indeed, studies have even showing that more 
numerate or more cognitively able individuals are more likely 
to interpret evidence in biased ways in polarised or highly 
contested political debates.15 Depending on the origins of bias, 
then, different mitigation strategies will likely be required.
There is still much to learn, however, to construct strategies 
for debiasing policy decision-making processes. Progress 
will require both conceptual and empirical work to inform 
the institutionalisation of strategies that can address forms 
of bias specific to the decision-making environment. 
Institutionalisation of such efforts is particularly important 
for several reasons. First, staff turnover and strategic shifts 
mean that critical awareness training can be limited in 
duration of effect. Changing institutional rules and processes, 
or shifting how incentives influence the decision points in 
the first place, may prove more sustainable as individuals 
come and go from institutional environments. Second, not 
all sources of bias arise from individual errors, with decision 
spaces promoting polarisation or group-think generating 
particular forms of bias outside individual control in some 
contexts. Organisational arrangements may, thus, also be 
important targets for bias reduction strategies – for example, 
through efforts aiming to construct deliberative spaces that 
facilitate listening and learning across divided groups16,17 or 
which reduce so-called enclave deliberation.18 And finally, 
given that humans are naturally prone to bias, resultant errors 
will be a continual and ongoing problem that systems need to 
be structured to address from the start, not one off problems 
to solve at a single points in time. 
At the moment, institutional bias-mitigation strategies in 
policy-making environments are often reported anecdotally, 
or not explicitly evaluated. So while it is known that 
misaligned incentives can facilitate bias, and while there have 
been calls to build political spaces to overcome polarisation 
(which evidence has shown can drive bias), there is not yet a 
strong evidence base testing whether, in practice, particular 
strategies reduce specific types of cognitive bias and 
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evidentiary errors. Indeed, even limited to the more specific 
case of clinical diagnostic errors arising from heuristic 
shortcuts, a recent systematic review found only a handful of 
tested interventions, showing heterogeneous results so far.19
Taking the next steps in this area will require building a field 
of conceptual and applied science to more systematically 
develop and test bias-reducing interventions in institutional 
settings. We are likely only just beginning to see the use of 
interventions of this kind, but the cognitive sciences provide a 
body of work on which to build plausible hypotheses on how 
to mitigate bias in policy-making or planning environments. 
Future work will require rigorous evaluation designs to test 
the efficacy of bias mitigation strategies, as well as critical 
thinking on the generalisability of efforts shown to produce 
effects in particular decision-making environments. 
Historically, we have not had a lack of recognition of our 
inherent tendencies towards evidentiary bias. Rather, we 
have seen a lack of integration of that knowledge into how 
we plan and act within those decision-making bodies making 
critical choices affecting human welfare. Humans may indeed 
be ‘irrational,’ but as Airely has noted, they are ‘predictably 
irrational.’20 What is needed now is to develop the scientific 
basis of how social policy-making institutions can integrate 
this knowledge to best avoid, identify, or mitigate cognitive 
biases and their associated errors.
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